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Abstract
The political fortunes of Sub-Saharan
Saharan Africa changed dramatically in the past twenty
twenty-five
five years. Since the
late 1980s, many countries have held regular multi
multi-party elections. A cross-national
national examination of voter
participation rates, a common starting point for work on democratization, is now possible. This paper
represents a first look at the determinants of voter turnout in 15 African states that have witnessed some
stability in national elections since 1988. Con
Controlling
trolling for several standard explanations of voter turnout, a
model is developed to test a colonial legacy thesis, which seeks to und
understand
erstand the influence the former
colonizing power has had on contemporary political outcomes. In addition, the research examines
ex
the role
played by ethnic fractionalization and religious diversity on electoral participation rates. The former is
found to associate with less participation and the lat
latter
er higher voter turnout. Moreover, the research
uncovers, on average, voter turnout
rnout is higher in former French colonies.
Key Words:: Voter Turnout; Africa; Democratization; Colonial Legacy; Ethnic Fractionalization; Religious
Pluralism

Introduction
Africa is home to about one-seventh
seventh of the world's people and itt contains a little over a quarter of
the world's nation-states.Being
Being the second largest continent in the world, Africa’s
’s great expanse
gives rise to a rich and diverse terrain featured in countless movies and photographs.
photographs Increasingly,
Africa has become a desired tourist destination for people from all over the globe. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately
governmental stability on much of the continent is incomplete. Nation-states
states often divide
d
along
ethnic lines, giving rise to political discord and social disharmony(Annett 2001;; Lindberg and
Morrison 2008; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010
2010).High natural resource endowments are not
dispersed equitably and are often linked to civil conflict (Homer-Dixon
Dixon 1994).
1994) Moreover,
Africa’s vast and varied terrain hides the fact there is a dearth of suitable farmland (Eswaran et al.
1996),which creates socio-economic
economic and political challenges. Nevertheless, shiftsto
to stable multiparty electionsin many nation-states
states,since the late 1980s and early 1990s,may
may mark a permanent
trend away from political strife toward a steadiersocial and economic life for much of the
continent (Wiseman 1993; Lindberg 2006).
This research studies recent elections in 15 Sub-Saharan African nation-states
nation
with a
focus on voter participation rates
rates. Scholars argue, quality electionswith
with reasonably
reasonabl high voter
turnout are central to the democratic experience and go a long way toward defining successful
democratic transition (Mozaffar 2002, 86; Moehler 2009)
2009). Political theorist
heorist Robert Dahl
(1989)argues, convincingly, tha
that the
he core institution of modern liberal democracy is competitive
and participatory elections.Although
hough elections with high voter turnout are insufficient to define
which countries are, and which are not,succeeding as democracies, scholarship
hip suggests that
competentelections
elections unlike any other democratic institution must precedee successful selfgovernance (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2006, 1).Moreover, many argue early
1
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electoral experiences represent a critical juncture in the trajectory of a body politic (Rustow 1970;
1970
Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007
2007) and that once
nce regularized, even the mere
presence of democratic elections
elections, helps to establish a self-reinforcing
reinforcing trend toward greater civil
and political liberties (Lindberg 2006).1
Hence, this inquiry into democratic development in Sub-Saharan Africa focuses on
elections. While
hile not an unqualified success (seeChabal
Chabal 1998; Brown and Kaiser 2007; Cheru
2012),over the past 25 years,multi
multi-party elections have become more commonin many countries
on the African continent.. Taking advantage of th
the relative stability, this researchinitiate
initiates a crossnational comparison of voter turnoutrates in an attempt to illuminate correlates in the manner
others have used to examine variance in voter turnout rates in other parts of the world.Distinct
fromothervoter turnout studies,, however, this research scrutinizes the colonizing experience each
of the countries enduredas itrelate
relates to contemporary variance in participation rates.A
rates colonial
legacy thesis has been a common baseline for work on ppolitical development in Africa(Brown
Africa
and Kaiser 2007; Englebert 2000; Mozaffar 2002).
In addition, we attempt to generalize, across nation-states and time, about the role of
ethnic and religious fractionalization on voter turnout rates. Many suggest ethnic identity and
conflict is a paramount explanation of electoral
electoral-political outcomes across Sub-Saharan
Saharan Africa
(Young 1976;
6; Bates 1983; Horowitz 1985; Lindberg and Mo
Morrison
ison 2008; Eifert, Miguel, and
Posner 2010; and on ethnic identity and seat volatility see Ferree 2010).We add something new to
this debate by also examining religious diversity, a consideration that has received much less
attention. In particular, we seek to test whether ethnic homogeneity may reduce political
tensionand
and associate with higher voter turnout rates, while
whilereligious homogeneity ordominance
or
by
a single religion may cause individuals, in the aggregate, to de-emphasize the political process
and associate with lower participation rates.
Importantly, we do not hold that higher voter turnout rates are analogous to greater
democratic development.The research
research, in this regard, must be viewed as incomplete.Our
incomplete.
more
limited intention is to further cross
cross-national
national discovery on the topic of voter turnout in African
elections, while uncovering insights that others might use to study democratic development more
directly. Ultimately, we will test the predictive power of the for
former
mer colonizer, ethnic pluralism,
religious pluralism, and several
everal control variables that others have foundaffect
affect voter turnout
patterns around the world.Sp
Specifically, we control for population density, adult literacy,
concurrent executive and legislative elections, founding elections, and the level of civil liberties
libert
and civil rights that characterizes each country in each election year as defined by the Freedom
House organization.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief
overview of earlier works on democratic transition in Sub-Saharan Africaparticularly
particularly as it relates
to colonialism and ethnic and religious pluralism
pluralism. The second develops and proposes hypotheses
regarding voter turnout,, based on previous scholarship. The third section presents the results of
our empirical tests, which is followed by a summary sectionthat attempts to explain the somewhat
counterintuitive findings related to former French colonies
colonies.Where others have suggested
suggest former
1

A lot of work is being done to define competent democracy by the Varieties of Democracy Project led by
Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, and Staffan Lindberg(http://kellogg.nd.edu/projects/vdem/ last accessed
8/27/2014). We cite Lindberg and various co-authors extensively throughout this paper because of their
work both in the democratization literature, but also for work on elections in Africa.
2
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British colonies, on average, ought to hhave greater
ater democratic success, this research finds all else
being equal, higher voter participation rates in former French colonies. We also uncover evidence
that ethnic pluralism associates with lower voter turnout, while religious diversity prompts higher
high
rates of voter participation.
Earlier Works on Sub-Saharan
Saharan African Democracy
The study of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, although becoming more common, still has
left significant theoretical and empirical holes.
holes.What has been learned, to date, often is applicable
to individual nation-states
states (Firmin
(Firmin-Sellers 2000;; Brown 2001; Schubert 2010; Hoffman and Long
2013). When scholars makecross
cross-national comparisons(Bratton and van de Walle 1997;
1997
Adejumobi 2000; Brown and Kaiser 2002
2002),by their own admission, the work has been largely
exploratory. In an important deviation, Mozaffar (2002) studies 36 Sub-Saharan African nationnation
states and learns former British colonies and ethnic fragmentation associate positively with the
autonomy of election management bod
bodies or state-run bureaucracies usedto
to organize and
legitimize the electoral process.. Another cross-national work examines a sample of countries and
survey data to learn thatas
as elections draw near
nearer ethnic identitybecomes more salient (Eifert,
Miguel, and Posner 2010).This
This researchwill use a similar approach to those just cited and seeks to
establish a starting point for further inquiry into the relationship between a host of predictor
variables and voter turnout rates
rates.
Probably the facet of democratic development in Africa studied the most is the extent to
which an uneven democratic experience is due to the dissimilar governing practices of each
colonizing power. Most notably, Gilbert and Reynolds (2008) note the varied philosophies of the
th
European colonizershave led to distinct government structures. The
he British model of colonial
governance is known as ‘indirect
indirect rule
rule’ for its greater reliance on local power structures (324). The
French orientation, stated at its best
best, was one of fostering equality between Europeans and
Africans but with Euro-centric
centric standards and little actual socio
socio-political
political or economic
equality(320-21).
21). The Portuguese and Belgian models were more closely aligned with the
French;although often there was
as evenfewercivil rights orliberties afforded indigenous populations
population
(322-23).
Others note the British common law legal system is responsible for greater civic culture
in the country’s former colonies ((Firmin-Sellers 2000;; La Porta et al. 1999; Hayek 1960).
1960 These
scholars note good governance and economic growthhave been less robust, on average, in former
French colonies. Under aBritish
British common law system, countries tend to have better property and
investor protections, which can lead
d to a more diverse spread of capital and higher aggregate
economic growth (Barro 1996)
1996). Accordingly, and broadening Firmin-Seller’s
Seller’s sample, Bossuroy
and Cogneau (2008) study inter
inter- and intra-generational social mobility in Africa.. Theirstudy
Their
of
five former colonies,which run
un the gamut of the democracy/authoritarian
/authoritarian spectrum, findsnative
populations in former British colonies ha
have better social mobility, after controlling for occupation
and educational status.2
Important for this work
work, we noteboth Britain and France introduced multi-party
party elections
prior to the independence movements thatswept Africa in the 1960s.. However, French colonies,
colonies
on average, had a longer experience and a greater number of multiparty elections (Collier 1982).
1982)
2

The British may also have been better at unwinding their hold on their colonies, transitioning power from
colonial
ial administrators to a new society, in a more functional and timely manner than the French.
3
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Lindberg (2006) has studied elections in nearly all Sub-Saharan African countries since 1989
198 and
one of his most important these
theses is that even when elections are merely ‘de
de jure’
jure they ‘have
allowed for equality of political participation and free competition
competition’ (8).. Lindberg emphasizes
em
the
important role played by successive election cycles as a legitimizing force and an important
barometer of the quality of the democratic process.Beginning in 1946, all former French colonies
elected representatives to assemblies in both France and local councils. Our suspicion is that these
regular-competitive
competitive elections might prompt greater legitimacy for the contemporary electoral
process in former French colonies.
Lindberg (2006) also notes
notes, political parties tend to be ethnically based across much of
Sub-Saharan Africa and that this
his presents several po
potential problems for the functioning of an
electoral system (see alsoEasterly
Easterly and Levine 1997; Posner 2004
2004; Posner 2005)). Importantly,
ethnic fractionalization has been negatively correlated with the quality of governance, as well as
economic growth (Blais 2000; Fornos et al. 2004
2004; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck
Beck 1994).Today,
1994
political parties in many African nation
nation-states continue to form along ethnic lines and incumbent
politicians have an easy time making the case that a win by an opponent may incite ethnopolitical violence (Bates 1994, 21).
21).This,
This, in turn, can have the effect of dampening
dampen
voter
enthusiasm, especially among moderates or non
non-group members.
Mozaffar, Scarritt
rritt and Galaich (2003)
(2003), for their part, show that ethnicity and electoral
rules interact in ways to create variance in the quality and manageability of multi-party
multi
elections.In particular, they note the high interest in concurrent elections, which tends
tend to increase
the number of coalitions, reduc
reducethe number of political parties, and mitigate the potential for
deadlock caused by ethno-political
political fragmentation
fragmentation.3 Moreover, Bratton and van de Walle (1997)
note the round of democratization that began in the early 1990s opened with less ethnic
fractionalization than had previously been witnessed (251
(251-252; see alsoMamdani
Mamdani 1996). Lindberg
(2006) attests to this and notes the hyper-regional
regional characteristic of parties has waned (78-80;
(78
see
also Reilly 2000-01).
Religion, and the effect of religious diversity on electoral processes and outcomes in
Africa, has not received nearly the level of attention that ethnic pluralism has.. Unlike ethnic
pluralism, religious
eligious diversitymay encourage participation.As noted, ethnicc pluralism has been
associated with the development of competing political parties that may advocate for election
violence and/or boycotts, both formal and informal. This obviously can decrease aggregate voter
turnout.However, when religious diversity pre
prevents a single religion from dominating
dominat
the sociopolitical life of a community, there may be greater voter participation. Previous researchers find
that religious homogeneity can prompt a scenario where
wherebypeople are more loyal to religious
traditions than they are political associations and, consequently, less concerned with the political
process (Fish 2002).4Religious pluralism and a more secular political process, one that puts a
3

Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) for their part find that electoral institutions and social cleavages are both
important, and that though district magnitude helps to define the number of parties involved in an election,
election
this effect is conditioned by ethnic group concentrations (385
(385-86).
4
Although work on religious pluralism in Africa is scarce, much has been written about the possible links
between organized religion
on and authoritarianism (Kakar 1996; Kalyvas 1996), primarily concerning Islam
and Catholicism (see alsoKalyvas,
Kalyvas, 2000 on the relevance of religious parties)
parties).. The conclusion is, generally,
that the more dominant a single religion is the weaker are democrati
democraticc institutions (Blais 2000; Fornos et al.
2004). Importantly, Fish (2002) has shown that predominantly Islamic or Catholic countries had poorer
4
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premium on participation sans religion
religion, might then associate with greater
er voter turnout, on
average.5
Research Design and Hypotheses
The study uses a Generalized L
Least Squares (GLS) regression model to explain voter turnout in
uninterrupted multi-party elections in 15 African countries. The elections took place between
1988 and 2012.When
When constructing the sample, several factors were considered. First, only
o
SubSaharan African nation-statesare
are included.The sample excludes the states of NorthAfricadue to
the region's distinct social and political history (Lindberg 2006, 9). Island nations were also
excluded due to their unique characteristics, not the least of which is small population. Explicitly,
any nation-state
state with a population below one million persons was not considered,
considered bolstering a
most similar case design intended to hold some socio
socio-economic and cultural considerations
constant.Next, we only use first round elections. Second round elections and referenda
r
are
excluded, again, for the purpose of analyzing as best as possible comparable cases.
cases Last, starting
the clock in 1988 coincidesloosely
esloosely with the latest wave of democratization in the region
(Huntington 1991).. The final sample can be seen in Table 1 and includes 92 elections; the
following footnote elaborates more on case selection
selection.6
(Table 1 goes about here. See appendix
appendix)
Dependent Variable: Voter turnout is modeled as the percentage of the voting age population
(VAP) that casts a vote in a given election year. The average value
alue for each of the 15 countries
included is provided in Table 1. Most specifically, total votes are divided bythe VAP (the over-18
population in each country).
). We uuse VAPinstead of registered voters because the data are
cleaner.Registration rolls in many African nation
nation-states are poorly tracked or maintained (Geys
2006, 639).Data on voting age population w
were retrieved from the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), as it has the most comprehensive database for
VAP. Data on total
otal votes cast w
were drawn from the online African Elections Database (AED),

democratic experiences but were not more violent and did not experience lower levels of interpersonal
trust. In his study, he controls for a wide range of factors including ethnic pluralism and a British colonial
heritage.
5
Varshney (2007) claims that ‘religion
religion’ is a particular kind of ‘ethnicity’ (277), but we hold that the
phenomena are distinct. We offer as evid
evidence the countervailing theoretical expectations cited above.
6
Initially, only
nly countries which maintained successful, de jure democratic electionssince the late 1980s
were in the sample. This consideration caused all former Belgium colonies to be dropped from the analysis.
analysis
We relax the coding rule and include ttwosuccessive and contemporary elections from Burundi and three
post-genocide
genocide elections from Rwanda to test the hypothes
hypothesiss that voter turnout will be lower in Belgium
colonies. Bratton and van de Walle
le (1997, 120
120-21) are particularly cognizant of the many issues
surrounding selecting a suitable sample of country
country-elections
elections to study. We include elections from some
cases they label ‘blocked
blocked transitions.
transitions.’ We fully appreciate their concerns and recognized this preliminary
test of voter turnout may be compromised by any of a number of factors related to money politics,
incomplete data, and fraud. Yet,we
,we hold there is value in initiating the discovery process nonetheless. In the
end, when the elections took place
lace in countries with flawed transitions we include elections only if there
was some minimal level of competition
competition, defined as the losing political parties receiving at least 30 percent
of the votes cast.
5
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and compared to data in Psephos (2013) and Elections in Africa (1999)for accuracy.We
accuracy
found
IDEA's data for total votes cast to be less reliable.7
Colonial Power.The first explanatory variable is the former colonizer in each of the 15 African
nation-states. The countries included were colonized by Britain, France, Belgium, and
Portugaland consequently four dummy variables are employed,one representing each colonizer.
Given the theoretical and empirical range of institutional bonuses former British colonies gained
upon independence, it is hypothesized that voter turnout should be higher in those countries than
elsewhere, ceteris paribus. British colonie
coloniess are the excluded group in the regression analysis,
providing the baseline for the statistical test
test. The expectation is that the testss will produce
negative regression coefficients suggesting that, on average, voter turnout will be lower in any of
the other countries than in former British colonies
colonies. In addition,we expectformer
former Belgian and
Portuguese colonies will produce the lowest voter turnout rates,, given their more limited efforts
to involve indigenous populations iin the legal and bureaucratic order during colonial times.
times
Portugal,scholars argue, had been particularly repressive (Gilbert and Reynolds 2008, 320-23).
320
Key Considerations: Ethnic and Religious Pluralism
Pluralism:Given the well-established
established ties between
ethnicity and party politics across Africa, Ethnic Pluralismis included as a key predictor of
variation in voter turnout rates across the countries studied. O
Our
ur expectation is that greater ethnic
diversity, on average, will lead to lower voter turnout. The causal argument is concern over the
tendency for ethnic-based
based political parties to sponsor election boycotts and electoral violence.
The latter is believed to deter people from showing themselves at polling stations, lest they be
caught up in violent acts. Data for ethnic pl
pluralism are retrieved from the last 25 annual editions
of the CIA World Factbook. Specifically, we subtract from 100 the percentage of the population
from the largest reported ethnic group. For instance, if the largest ethnic group comprises
comprise 32
percentof a country's population
tion, the variable’svalue is‘68.’ Scored as such, a largervalue implies
that the largest ethnic group is a smaller percentage of the total population
population,and
and greater ethnic
pluralism prevails. The mean ethnic pluralism value for all cases is 34.9 percent with a standard
deviation of over 30 percent.
Religious Pluralismis measured in the same manner as ethnic pluralism. Data,
Data again, are
obtained from the annual editions of the CIA World Factbook. Scores for religious pluralism
range from six percent in Senegal in 2007 and 2012 to 76.2 percent for Mozambique in 2012.
Senegal is about 94 percent Sunni Muslim and correspondingly the country is the most
mos religiously
homogeneous of the nation-states
statesstudied.. In Mozambique the largest religious group is Catholic,
but this group comprises less than 25 percent of the country’s population. The average value for
all cases is 39.7 percent.
7

We contacted IDEA concerning four issues we unco
uncovered with their data. Two were simple copy-paste
copy
errors. The other two were transcription errors: the last digit was missing. Finally, their data include an
inconsistency in coding Total Votes for multi
multi-round
round elections. Sometimes, first round numbers are used,
while other times it is second round numbers. Because of th
these
se problems, we turned to alternative sources
relying most heavily on the African Elections Database (AED), as it appears to be the most comprehensive
source of voter turnout data.. IDEA and AED values are identical or nearly identical for many elections, but
when they were not, we turned to Elections in Africa and Psephos as a means of triangulating on the
‘correct’ value. AED tended to match these other sources more often than IDEA.
6
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Demographic Controls:As
As attested to in studies of other parts of the world,, education tends to be
positively correlated with voter turnout (Geys 2006, 653). Literacy,, as a percentage of the total
population is used here, as elsewhere (Schraufnagel and Sqouraki 2005), as a proxy for a better
education system. Data were gathered from the CIA World Factbook.. Literacy scores range from
10 percent(Senegal
(Senegal in 1988) to over 85 percent in Kenya during the 2000s.. Across all cases there
is a mean value of about 52 percent
percent.
Population Density is used as a proxy for access to vot
voting
ing stations. Given the scattered,
rural nature of many parts of Africa, it is expected that higher population densities make voting
easier by reducing the distance necessary to travel to polling stations. The variable is measured as
the number of people per square kilometer
kilometer. Data were retrieved from the United
U
Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Density varies widely across Sub-Saharan
Saharan Africa,
with Gabon in the middle single digits (3.8 persons per square kilometer in 1993) and Burundi
and Rwanda at the extreme high end with about 300 to 400 persons per square kilometer over the
last decade.
Classic Controls:Three
Three additional
additionalvariables
variables were included in the analysis as they are common
control considerations in voter turnout studies. The first
first, Concurrent Elections
lections, is a wellestablished and important control variable in the voter mobilization literature. Cox and Munger
(1989) suggest that when the chief executive and the legislature are elected at the same time there
is increased media attention and greater sums spent on campaigning and voter mobilization
efforts (see also Geys2006, 6522).Moreover, others note, because voting is typically a fixed cost,
‘an
an added election on the ballot spreads the cost of voting
voting’ (Carter 1984, 201n).
201
A dummy
variable is generated,scored‘1’ for concurrent elections, and the expectation is that the test will
uncover a positive association with voter turnout
turnout. Data were obtained from the African Elections
Database (2013).
SeminalElections is another common control variable in analysis of cross-national
cross
variance in voter turnout. Previous work on turnout in Latin America and Eastern Europe has
found much higher rates in seminal elections (Kostadinova and Power 2007). Specifically, we
score an election as ‘seminal’ if it is the first competitive election following regime change. In
many of these cases, individuals were granted the ability to choose between candidates from
different political parties for the first time in a generation (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 207).
207)
The ability to have a democratic voice
voice,, along with the novelty of the enterprise is likely to
increase the rate of voter involvement relative to other elections. Elections
lections are scored ‘1’whenit
is the first to occur after regime cchange or a switch from single-party to multi-party
party elections.
Data were gathered from the African Elections Database (2013).
The final variableincluded
included in the model is a measure for the democratic characterofthe
characterof
country in the year the election was held
held. We measure this using Freedom House's
House ‘Political
Rights’ and ‘Civil Liberty’ scores, indicators that appear in other works of a similar genre (Fornos
et al. 2004, 921; Burkhart and Lewis
Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994). Freedom House scores on each
of the two dimensions range from 1 (most
(mostly free) to 7 (least free), resulting in a scale that ranges
from ‘2’ to ‘14’ when the indices are combined. TheFreedom House score is intended to control
for varying degrees of democratic penetration in countries at the time the election was held.
held The
lowest score,, indicating greater freedom, occurs in Ghana in both the 2008 and 2012 election
cycles (a combined score of 3)
3). Cameroon,with a total score of either 11 or 12throughout the
7
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study period,, represents the other extreme. Others note that the degree
egree of democracy,
democracy in general,
is positively correlated with voter turnout (Blais 2000; Fornos et al. 2004
2004; Schraufnagel
Schrau
and
Sgouraki 2005, 48). Given
en the way the scale is operationalized, higher scores (less freedom) are
expected to associate with a lower level of voter turnout.8 Put differently, the regression results
are expected to produce a negative coefficient.
Results
Results of the regression analysis can be found in Table 2 (see appendix). Contrary to base
expectations, former French colonies are witnessing greater voter turnout levels than former
British colonies.. Given the model configuration
configuration, with former British colonies establishing the
baseline, we learn there has been about 13 percent greater voter tur
turnout
nout in French colonies, on
average, all else being equal. One possible explanation is the longer history and greater number
ofstate-managed elections in former French colonies prior to independence. Alternatively, the
sample may be picking up the characte
characterr of the regimes just prior to independence. Bratton and
van de Walle note (1997) those countries which liberalized the most (perhaps prompting greater
voter turnout) at the beginning of the latest wave of democratization were civilian-ruled
civilian
singleparty regimes,, many of which were former French colonies (188). Given the surprising nature of
this finding further study is justified. In the summary we will elaborate in more detail the two
competing theoretical explanations just offered.
(Table 2 goes about here. See appendix
appendix)
Considering the other two colonizers in the analysis it can be noted both
b
former
Belgiancolonies
colonies (Burundi and Rwanda) have witnessed lower voter turnout than the former
French colonies after controlling for other factors
factors,, but also substantially lower voter turnout than
former British colonies. The single former Portuguese colony (Mozambique) had lower voter
turnoutthan the former French colonies; however
however, there is no statistical difference between voter
turnout levels in Mozambique and former British colonies, all else being equal. Results regarding
the former Belgian colonies (Burundi and Rwanda) are not surprising given recent history, which
has included coups and in the case of Rwanda, genocidal civil war. The relative short or truncated
democratic experience does not seem to have been sufficient to have legitimized the electoral
process
ocess in a manner that would encourage
encouragewidespread participation.
Both tests of ethnic and religious pluralism return statistically significant coefficients in
the direction hypothesized; although the value of the coefficient for ethnic pluralism is double the
size of the value for religious pluralism. Because these two variables are measured in the same
manner it is possible to make this comparison. Substantively, the coefficient representing the
effect of ethnic pluralism suggests that as the largest ethnic group grows in size by five percent
(say from 70 to 75 percent) voter turnout will increase by about 1.5 percent (.30 x 5), all else
being equal. Considering religious pluralism
pluralism, as the largest religious group shrinks in size (say
from 65 to 60 percent)—indicating
indicating greater pluralism
pluralism—there will be a correspondingincrease
correspondi
in
8

A variable commonly used in cross
cross-national
national tests of voter turnout is compulsory or mandatory voting.
However, Gabon is the only country in our dataset with mandatory voting, and in Gabon the law is not
enforced (IDEA). The lack of variation on this othe
otherwise
rwise important consideration causes us to not include
the variable in this analysis.
8
Research Centre for Management and Social Studies

Journal of Good Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa (JGGSDA), Vol. 2, No 3, December,
December 2014.
Website: http://www.rcmss.com.. ISSN: 2354
2354-158X (Online) ISSN: 2346-724X (Print)

Scot Schraufnagel
Schraufnagel& Peter Gowen, 2014, 2(3):1-15

voter turnout of about .75 percent (.15 x 5), on average. Given the range of the religious pluralism
variable is about 70 percent, the full range of the religious pluralism consideration is associated
with about a 10.5 percent increase in vot
voter turnout (70 x .15).
Results for literacy conf
conform well to expectations, as does the population density
consideration. The latter is strongly correlated with voter turnout ((r = .43; p<
< .001) and in the
multivariate testing it proves to be the variabl
variable most strongly linked,statistically, to voter turnout.
Given much of Sub-Saharan
Saharan Africa isrural;this
his finding has important policy implications. As
noted above, it is assumed that population density is capturing something about the accessibility
of polling stations. Hence, if increasing voter participation rates is a priority, one can imagine a
concerted effort to make polling stations more geographically convenient might lead to higher
turnout rates.
Two
wo of the three classic control variables are statistically significant. Only the Freedom
House consideration of democratic rights and liberties does not link
link, statistically, to voter turnout
in the testing. It can be noted that a simple bivariate relationship is also not statistically
significant (r = .06; p<
< .60). This finding could be the result of corruption, in the form of vote
buying or the over-reporting
reporting of voting
voting, in more authoritarian settings (APSA
APSA Workshop 2008;
Nichter 2008). If voting irregularities are occurring in more authoritarian settings we would
expect higher Freedom House scores (less openness) to comport with higher turnout values.
Using this sample of elections, cconcurrent
oncurrent elections, which tend to increase voter awareness and
interest, are associated with about 111 percentincrease in voter turnout.. Seminal elections, which
may also associate with higher voter interest, arelinked to an increase in voter turnoutof
turnout about 10
percent, all else being equal.
Summary
This researchtests a model of voter turnout
turnout, across a sample of Sub-Saharan African
n nation-states.
nation
This type of query only became possible following asignificant turn toward
ward consistent multi-party
elections since the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Lancaster 1991-92). The relative normalcy of
electoral processes has allowed this initial testing of factors theoretically linked to variance in
voter turnout levels in Africa. S
Specifically, the research has been able to follow the line of work
which hasused a colonial legacy thesis to study democratic transitions in Africa, while controlling
for ethnic and religious pluralism and other considerations that matter for voter turnout in other
parts of the world..
A primary contribution has been the finding that French
colonies,aftercontrolling for population density and other considerations,are associated
associate with
higher electoral participation rates than former British colonies.
Given theunexpected
unexpected result regarding former French colonies additional scrutiny of the
colonial legacy thesis seems warranted
warranted. There are two alternative theoretical arguments that can
be found in existing literature that might help to elucidate th
the finding. First, it may be the case the
longer duration and greater number of state
state-managed multi-party elections in former French
colonies,prior to independence, is responsible for the finding. Lindberg (2006) has noted former
French colonies' had seven multi
multi-party elections prior to independenceand
and that these experiences
may have‘locked in’ a kind of institutional memorythat
that leads to contemporary acceptance of
elections as a legitimate means of citizen control (112).Put differently, it may be that even when
elections are not likely to have a substantive effect on the lives of people participating in them,
their mere presence creates in these same people an appreciation for the process. If this is true, it
causes one to wonder what other facets of democratic development might also be affected by de
9
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jure electoral experiences.9 Complimenting this explanation is the unique way each set of former
European colonies achieved independence. Former French colonies voted themselves
independent via plebiscite (Gilbert
Gilbert and Reynolds 2008
2008).. This experience alone might be shaping
subsequent citizen judgment of electoral legitimacy.
We must also consider the contentions of Bratton and van de Walle (1997) who suggest
the type of regime change can influence subsequent democratic outcomes. They
hey note during the
most recent switches from single
single-party to multi-party elections in Africa itt was the subset of
moderately exclusionary authoritarian regimes which liberalized the most
most.Countries
Countries that had
broader multi-party experiencess liberalized less, and military authoritarian regimes democratized
more in law than in fact. Put differently, the middle range of countries, civilian single-party
single
regimes,, witnessed the greatest liberalization and made the largest leaps toward democratization.
democrati
When protests grew in the 1980s
1980s, the next step for many of the middle-range regimes, if
i they
hoped to remain in power, was more legitimate multi-partyelections (Bratton
Bratton and van de Walle
1997, 187-88). Importantly, for our purposes there is a match between many of the former
f
French
colonies in our sample and those nation
nation-states
states that Bratton and van de Walle characterize as
civilian single-party systems.
It is also important for us to reiterate our supporting findings regarding
garding ethnic
fractionalization.. Early researche
researchers
rs on this topic likely are not surprised by our finding that lower
voter turnout occurs under conditions of greater ethnic diversity
diversity. Others note, fractionalization
associates with more ethnic based political parties and more difficult elections
elections. Electora
lectoral violence
under conditions of ethnic diversity is often the norm. This study is suggesting that perhaps
moderates, people less enamored by politics, and others with justifiable fears related to electoral
violence are less likely to show themselves at poll
polling stations when ethno-political
political rivalry is
salient. If corroborated this finding suggests the need for political parties that cut across ethnic
cleavages. It has long been argued that the factional basis of political parties,, whether based on
ethnicity, class, religion, or geography has important implications for democratic development
(La Palombara and Weiner 1966; on Nigeria see Jinadu 1985).
Interestingly, we find that increased religious diversity may lead to higher voter
vo turnout.
This is not to suggest that political parties should be based on religious affiliations. Instead, our
suspicions, based on previous research (Fish 200
2002),
), are that when a single religion dominates a
country that citizen loyalty is to their religion and not the political process.. It is reasonable to
assume there is some critical level or cut point that might cause a country’s citizens, in the
aggregate, to tip toward an apolitical posture that decreases the salience and value of elections.
Indeed,
ed, when we test a dummy variable scored one when religious pluralism was lower than .20,
suggesting the dominant religion has over 80 percent of the population as members,
members voter turnout
is over 10 percent lower, on average
average, a finding that is stronger than what
at we obtained when
preserving the full range of the religious pluralism variable.
Finally, the suite of control variables incorporated into the model delivered results as
expected. Only, the
he combined Freedom House score proved less substantial than one would
expect. A more authoritarian political posture is not statistically linked to less vvoter
oter turnout. The
effect of fower civil liberties and civil rights might be dampened by vote buying and election
9

Anderson and Dodd (2005) in their work on democratic transition in Nicaragua suggest there is something
akin to ‘democratic learning’ that takes place in the earliest stages of democratic development that can
translate into thoughtful and meaningful electoral outcomes.
10
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rigging in more authoritarian settings (APSA Work
Workshop 2008; Nichter 2008). The importance of
our finding related to the control variables population density, literacy, concurrent elections, and
seminal elections should not be overlooked. What these findings suggest is that for all intents and
purposes, voter turnout in this sample of African elections, on some level, is as predictable as it is
in other parts of the world. Using the same control variables that others find important in
desperate cultural and geographic contexts we find statistically signi
significant
ficant relationships. In
particular, our finding regarding population density is not only consistent with previous literature
(Schraufnagel and Sgouraki 200
2005)) but also points to a possible policy solution for raising voter
turnout levels: more geographical
geographically convenient polling stations.
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Appendix
Table 1.
Countries and Years Included in the Analysis:Including Former Colonizer and Average Turnout Value
Country
Colonizer
Years Included
Avg. Turnout of VAP
1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001,
Benin
France
70%
2003, 2006, 2007, 2011
Botswana
Britain
1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
48%
1991, 1992, 1997, 1998, 2002,
Burkina Faso
France
35%
2005, 2007, 2010, 2012
Burundi
Belgium
2005, 2010
65%
1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2004,
Cameroon
France
49%
2007, 2011
1993, 1995, 1998, 2005, 2009,
Gabon
France
43%
2011
1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2006,
Gambia
Britain
48%
2007, 2011, 2012
1992 (2), 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008,
Ghana
Britain
66%
2012
Kenya
Britain
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013
48%
Malawi
Britain
1993, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
75%
Mozambique
Portugal
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009
51%
Rwanda
Belgium
2003, 2008, 2010
92%
1988, 1993 (2), 1998, 2000, 2001,
Senegal
France
36%
2007 (2), 2012 (2)
Tanzania
Britain
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
52%
1992, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003,
Togo
France
80%
2005, 2007, 2010
Table 2.
Turnout of Voting Age Population in 15 Select African Nation
Nation-States:Multi-Party
Party Elections, 1988-2013
1988
Generalized Least Squares Regression for Cross-Sectional Time-Series Data
Colonial Power (Britain omitted):
Exp. Sign
Coefficient (robust s.e.)
France
13.01 (4.02)***
-55.76(11.25)***
Belgium
-6.71 (8.17)
Portugal
Key Considerations:
Ethnic Pluralism
Religious Pluralism

+

-.30(.06) ***
.15 (.08) *

Demographic Controls:
Population Density
% Population Literate

+
+

.28 (.05) ***
.22 (.09) **

Classic Controls:
Concurrent Election
Seminal Election
Freedom House (combined)

+
+
-

11.31 (5.22) *
9.80 (4.22)*
-.97 (.74)

Constant
Wald Chi2
R2 (overall)
n
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05; tp< .10 (one
(one-tailed tests)
Note: Standard errors clustered around 15 country values.
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27.14 (6.97) ***
6915.32 ***
.55
92

Journal of Good Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa (JGGSDA), Vol. 2, No 3, December,
December 2014.
Website: http://www.rcmss.com.. ISSN: 2354
2354-158X (Online) ISSN: 2346-724X (Print)

Scot Schraufnagel
Schraufnagel& Peter Gowen, 2014, 2(3):1-15
Author Biographies
Scot Schraufnagel is Graduate Director and Associate Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois
University. He is a former Peace Corps volunteer, serving in Sierra Leone, West Africa. His research
interests include cross-national
national voter turnout, politic
political
al parties, and legislative processes. He is the author of
three books and his research appears in leading political science journals such as the American Journal of
Political Science and Political Science Quarterly
Quarterly.
Peter Gowen is an Online Analytics Coor
Coordinator
dinator for the Faculty Development and Instruction Design
Center at Northern Illinois University. He has MA degrees in both computer science and political science
from Northern Illinois University.

15
Research Centre for Management and Social Studies

